NAFTA came into force in 1994 under the Clinton administration. The goal of the agreement was to stimulate trade within North America between Canada, the United States and Mexico. It also aimed to remove barriers to trade between the three parties, as well as to most taxes and tariffs on goods imported and exported by each. According to Chad P. Bown (Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics), „it is unlikely that a renegotiated NAFTA, which would create trade barriers, will see workers who have lost their jobs, regardless of their cause, use new employment opportunities.“  Comparing trade vote counts in the 1990s, the most important factor, distinguishing successes from failures, is whether there were concrete benefits that were sufficient to mobilize supporters. A simple comparison does the trick. In 1997, when there was no trade agreement, the fast track procedure failed in Parliament, but in 1994, while Uruguay Round`s hard-won gains remained unresolved, the vote in the House of Representatives was 295 votes to 125, with 59% of Democrats in favour. Similarly, despite the unpopularity of trade votes in 2000, China`s vote on the NRNP was concluded in 2000 because of the strength of the underlying trade agreement with China. After U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January 2017, he tried to replace NAFTA with a new agreement and began negotiations with Canada and Mexico. In September 2018, the United States, Mexico and Canada reached an agreement to replace NAFTA with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the three countries had ratified it until March 2020. Nafta remained in effect until the implementation of the USMCA.  In April 2020, Canada and Mexico informed the United States that they were ready to implement the agreement.
 The USMCA came into force on July 1, 2020 and replaced NAFTA. Since its inception, NAFTA has benefited the economy by bringing total trade between countries to more than $1 trillion. However, since the adoption of the Uruguay Round legislation in 1994 and the strengthening of the WTO dispute settlement system, there has been a significant change in the US approach. The Clinton administration has decided to continue trade disputes over the WTO system; Although the administration continues to invoke Section 301, all of the 301 measures have indeed been followed in parallel with WTO decisions and subject to WTO decisions. Perhaps the most striking example is the case of Kodak-Fuji, where the government ended the continuation of Section 301 following a loss of the WTO. Exceptions to this rule have been limited to cases exempted from China, as it has remained outside the WTO, as well as intellectual property cases imposed by the „Special 301“ legal standards, for which eligibility requirements for preferential trade programs in the United States exceed WTO standards. It is more difficult to see evidence that congressional trade policy changed significantly in the 1990s or that partisanship has increased. If so, political party politics may have weakened slightly, as more moderate Democrats voted in favor of trade and more Republicans voted against trade for ideological or electoral reasons.